Step 1: Stand up DV-ToolAgent and trace one benign ticket
You are the defender on DV-ToolAgent, ACME Cloud's internal operations assistant. It is a real ReAct-style tool-using agent, not a chatbot you talk to directly. A staff member hands it an inbound support ticket and the agent runs a loop:
think the model reads the ticket and the system prompt
call it emits a native tool call (db_query, http_fetch, read_record, memory_*)
dispatch tools.dispatch asks policy.decide(user, tool, args) -> allow / deny / approve
observe the tool result is fed back; the loop repeats until the model answers
Before you defend anything, stand the agent up and trace one benign in-scope ticket so
you know what "normal" looks like. Every later step measures a deviation from this
baseline. Two facts matter here. The agent acts for ticket-bot, the low-privilege
ingest account that processes inbound tickets; it should read account data, not change
it. And there is no secret in the system prompt and no instruction to obey directives
found in a ticket. Every later exploit abuses a tool the agent legitimately exposes,
made the helpful path by congruent ticket wording.
do this
1. Seed the database and memory, then process one benign ticket.
Hit Run, or in the terminal:
python3 dvtoolagent.py --seed
python3 memory_seed.py
python3 dvtoolagent.py "Process inbound ticket: please confirm the billing payee currently on file for the GLOBEX account."
--seed (re)creates /home/labuser/agent.db with the accounts, invoices,
records, and tickets tables. memory_seed.py plants one benign baseline note owned
by finance-clerk. The third call runs the agent once as ticket-bot.
2. Read the TRACE and EFFECTS lines and confirm the action is a read.
A benign confirm-the-payee ticket should drive a single db_query that runs a
SELECT against accounts and returns the GLOBEX row. Nothing should be written. That
confirms in-scope tool use works cleanly before you start attacking it.
3. Read policy.decide, tools.dispatch, and dvtoolagent.run in the source.
tools.dispatch()routes every tool call throughpolicy.decide(user, tool, args)and obeysallow/deny/approve. You will hardenpolicy.py; you do not edit the agent loop, the prompt, ortools.py.policy.decide()is the shipped vulnerable starter: it returnsDecision("allow")for everything. Note that the acting identity istools.CURRENT_USER, set bydvtoolagent.run. You will key the control on it from Step 5 onward.
Pass criteria
The database is seeded (/home/labuser/agent.db exists) and a benign payee-lookup
ticket processed as ticket-bot reads the GLOBEX row without mutating it. That
confirms the agent is live and in-scope tool use is clean.
provided for you:internal_svc.pylistener.pymemory_seed.pypolicy.pyseed_db.pyticket_ssrf.mdticket_write.mdtools.py